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RICHARD FLETCHER.
The lives of distinguished advocates and jurists are always
interesting to their professional brethren, especially to the
younger members of. the bar, who are seeking to learn what
potent magic raises such men to eminence. It seems to us,
therefore, that a brief sketch of the life and character of one
who, for many years, at the bar and on the bench, bore the
highest rank in Massachusetts, cannot be out of place in this
journal.
Richard Fletcher was born at Cavendish, in Vermont, January 8, 1788. His father, Asaph Fletcher, was for many years
a successful physician, in extensive practice in that region. He
entered Dartmouth College in the year 1802, and graduated
with distinction in 1806. His part, at commencement, was the
valedictory oration. He was the teacher of the academy at
Salisbury, N. H., for about a year after he graduated. He
then went to Portsmouth, N. H., where he studied law with
Daniel Webster, and was admitted to the bar in 1809 or 1810.
Mr. Fletcher commenced the practice of his profession at
Salisbury, to which place he was invited by the men of business there, with whom he had became acquainted while he was
teaching in the academy. Here he very rapidly gained a large
if not very lucrative practice. In 1816 he delivered an oration
before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Dartmouth College,
which was well received by the literati who heard it.
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In 1819 he removed to Boston, and it was not long before he
was recognized as an able and industrious lawyer, whose services were in frequent demand in the courts, and at his office.
Mr. Fletcher was brought very conspicuously before the
public, as counsel for the defendants, in the suit of the proprietors of the Charles River Bridge against the proprietors of
Warren Bridge. The plaintiffs were incorporated, in 1785, to
build a bridge over Charles river, from Boston to Charlestown
(at the place where there was an old ferry, of which Harvard
College received the income), with a right to take tolls for a
period of forty years, which was afterward, by an act passed
in 1792, extended to seventy, on the occasion of a bridge being
authorized higher up the river, between Boston and Cambridge.
The first act required the plaintiffs to pay the college an annual
sum as a compensation for the destruction of the ferry. The
plaintiffs' bridge, which was the only direct avenue from Boston
to a large part of the populous counties of Middlesex and Essex,
proved a source of immense profit to its owners. In 1828 the
legislature, after much resistance, passed an act authorizing
the defendants to build a bridge from Boston to Charlestown,
which, when built, was distant, on the Boston side, only nine
hundred and fifteen feet, and on the Charlestown side only two
hundred and sixty feet from the plaintiffs' bridge. The tolls
of the new bridge were only to continue until its costs were
paid, and in no event more than six years. As soon as the
defendants commenced building their bridge, the plaintiffs
brought a bill in equity to enjoin them against proceeding with
the work. The plaintiffs, in their bill and argument before
the court, urged that when the Legislature chartered their
bridge with a right to take tolls for forty years, which, for
good consideration, was extended to seventy, the acts created
a contract that the State would not authorize another bridge
to be built so near as to accommodate exactly the same line
of travel, and, therefore, that the charter of the new bridge,
which must seriously diminish and soon destroy the value of
the old one, was a violation of the Constitution of the United
States, as it directly impaired the obligation of this contract.
The plaintiffs claimed to be assignees of the ferry, and con-
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tended that another ferry so near the old one would be a nuisance to it, and, therefore, that the new bridge, so near the old
one, must be a nuisance to the latter. The plaintiffs further
contended, that to tolerate the use of the new bridge would
deprive them of their property without compensation, and
that the defendants' charter thus violated both the Constitution of the United States and that of Massachusetts.
It was further urged that the building of the old bridge, at
the time it was undertaken, was a hazardous experiment; that
the charter granted the original proprietors was no more than
afair compensation for the risk they incurred; and finally, that
many of the present proprietors had bought their stock at very
high prices, trusting to the faith of the State, and that it was
in the highest degree unjust thus to destroy their property,
The defendants answered, that granting the right to build a
bridge and take tolls implied no contract that the legislature
would not authorize the building of another bridge near it,
whenever the public needed one. The defendants also denied
that the college owned the ferry, or that the plaintiffs were
assignees of the ferry, etc. They'denied that any property of
the plaintiffs had been taken for public use, since their whole
franchise still remained.
While the case was in progress it excited a wide interest in
the profession and the public. The inhabitants of Middlesex
and Essex were loudly clamoring for free access to Boston, and
insisting that a chartered monopoly, of which the proprietors
had been repaid the original cost of their undertaking, with
interest, over and over again, ought notto betolerated against
the necessities of the people. Public meetings expressed their
feelings very strongly. At one of them a vote was adopted,
that free bridges were one of the natural rights of man !
The bar was very much divided on the great legal questions
involved in the case. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts refused to grant an interlocutory injunction to prevent the
building of the bridge at the outset. At the final hearing the
court were equally divided, PARKER, C. J., and PuTNAH, J.,
being for the plaintiffs, and WILDE and MORTON, J. J., being
for the defendants. The bill, therefore, was dismissed.
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The case was then carried, by writ of error, before the Supreme Court of the United States, where it was twice argued
on account of a disagreement of the court, and finally decided,
in 1837, in favor of the proprietors of the new bridge. The
judges were still divided, STORY giving a long and learned
opinion in favor of the plaintiffs, in which THOMPSON fully
concurred, and MCLEAN, though he assented to the decision of
the court on other grounds, taking the same view as STORYin
the main question in the case: 11 Peters 420.
Mr. Fletcher conducted the defendants' cause with untiring
zeal, industry and ability, before legislative committees, in
order to secure a charter, and before the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts.
We have given the history of this case at some length, both
on account of the important principle it establishes and the
weight it added to Mr. Fletcher's professional reputation. The
principle settled by this decision, which has become a leading
authority, is, that a legislative grant of a right to build abridge
a canal or a railroad, with the privilege of taking tolls, does
not of itself create an implied contract that the legislature will
not authorize another structure so near as to seriously impair
or destroy the value of the original franchise.
Long before the case was ended, Mr. Fletcher was regarded
as one of the leaders of the bar in Boston, in the same rank
with Webster and Shaw, afterward Chief Justice, the counsel
opposed to him in this case, and the other eminent lawyers of
Massachusetts, whose reputation was then established.
Mr. Fletcher was for many years employed in a very large
part of the most important cases which came before the courts
in Boston, insurance, and other commercial cases, admiralty
cases, real actions,-cases of contested wills, and the construction
of wills and equity suits. Indeed, he acted as counsel in all
kinds of cases, except criminals, in which he very rarely took
any part. Beside his business in the courts, he was very much
consulted by banks, insurance companies, and men of wealth,
though he was readv to counselthosein humbler circumstances.
Mr. Fletcher took a deep interest in the politics of the country, but he had no taste for public life. He could not, however,
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resist the solicitations of his friends, and became a member of
Congress in 1837, but in 1839 resigned his seat and resumed
his professional practice.

In 1848 he was appointed an Associate Justice of the Su.
preme Court of Massachusetts. He did not retain the office
many years, resigning it in 1853, to the deep regret of.his
associates on the bench, the bar and the public.
He again resumed the practice of his profession. But aftei
this time he gradually withdrew from the bar, and for some
years before his death, which took place June 21, 1869, he had
given up all attention to legal business.
Judge Fletcher was never married. He acquired a handsome fortune, the bulk of which, by his will, after making suitable provisions for his relations and friends, and some
charitable donations, he gave to Dartmouth College, where he
was educated. One provision of his will deserves notice as illustrating his character. He directs the income of ten thousand dollars of the money given the college, as far as necessary, to be used in paying a prize of five hundred dollars
biennially, for the best essay calculated to extend the practical
influence of Christianity.
A few years before his death, Judge Fletcher gave his
valuable law library to the University of Michigan.
Mr. Fletcher was endowed by nature with great advantages
for a successful advocate, an agreeable countenance, expressive
of intellect, integrity and sympathy, features finely chiseled, a
clear and pleasant voice, and a form both graceful and commanding. His prepossessing appearance was a true key to his
real character. He had a nervous temperament and delicate organization, scarcely capable to appearance of enduring the
severe labors and exciting contests of the forum. His judgment was sound, penetrating, vigorous, and discriminating, al.
ways ready and reliable. He spoke with ease and fluency.
To other qualifications for his chosen profession, Mr. Fletcher
added patient and unwearied industry, and the most careful
study and training. Yet his devotion to his profession still
left him time to gain a familiar and extensive knowledge of
English literature. His faculties were well balanced and acted
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in harmony. His great conscientiousness placed him above all
professional trickery, and influenced him in all the relations of
life. His manners were marked by urbanity and kindness,
without the least display or assumption of superiority. His
conversation was always agreeable, enriched by the stores of
his. learning and experience, and pervaded by playful humor.
As a counselor, he was careful and deliberate. He never,
unless the occasion absolutely demanded it, would give a hasty
opinion, but always examined and weighed all authorities and
arguments bearing on both sides of any question submitted to
him with judicial care andimpartiality before giving his answer.
Hence, his opinions, while at the bar, were highly prized. The
length of time he often consumed before giving his answer to
legal questions presented to him sometimes left the impression on careless observers that the movemtents of his mind
were sluggish. Nothing could be more incorrect than this
idea. His thoughts flowed in rapid succession, though his caution and conscience prevented him from pouring them out
while crude and undigested.
Though his great success at the bar created a constant demand for his services, he was reluctant to engage in any jury
trial, without investigating in the most thorough manner the
facts and the law bearing on the case. His careful and critical
research occasionally wearied his juniors, but he never lost a
case from want of preparation. He knew beforehand his adversary's strongest and weakest points, and was always ready
both for attack and defense.
Juries were charmed by his grace and dignity in addressing
them, and his warm and earnest manner. He was always an
agreeable and persuasive speaker, and, when occasion required,
powerful and impressive. He disdained sophistry and used
little mere rhetorical display. He urged and reiterated the arguments drawn from the evidence in the case, placing them
in new points of view, and shedding new light on them at every
repetition, till he was sure they were appreciated. His addresses
to the jury were frequently enlivened by pleasant wit and
humor; sometimes by trenchant sarcasm; and occasionally
by appropriate anecdotes.
His memory was remarkable for
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accurazy and tenacity, so that everything bearing on the
ease he was trying, once known to him, was constantly and
steadily in his recollection. This power aided him in examining and cross-examining witnesses, and he never failed to
draw from them all that they knew material to the investigation. This wonderful memory enabled'him to present to
juries the salient points of the testimony before them with
great effect.
Mr. Fletcher's arguments on questions of law before the
court were forcible, well arranged, logical and exhaustive.
He was never satisfied until he had become familiar with all
that his law books could furnish him on the subjdct, and then,
by patient thought, had formed a cogent chain of reasoning.
As a judge he was a great favorite with the bar. He tried
cases like a master of the work; while his manner, though
dignified, was courteous and encouraging. His opinions, as
they appear in the report, are highly creditable to him as a
jurist. They are sound, systematic and logical in reasoning,
duly fortified with authorities and presented in a style of
great clearness and precision. Without being loaded with a
show of learning, they exhibit an intimate and exact knowledge of the subject under discussion.
Though Judge Fletcher, no doubt, had ambitious aspirations,
yet his whole career, as already intimated, is marked throughout by a presiding conscientiousness. It was this, which, even
when he had attained the highest rank in the profession, made
him so exacting in his labors for his clients, as if he had not
done enough while anything possible remained to be done.
It was this same conscientiousness which made him so devout
a Christian and dictated the prize proposed by his will, as
if he felt that he was bound to do all in his -power,even after
death, to promote the general welfare of his fellow-men.
Before he went to Congress his mind had not been awakened
to the real nature of American slavery. But witnessing the
system in Washington, and seeing its effect on the character
of slaveholders so impressed him that, after his final return
to Boston, he became an outspoken and uncompromising
enemy of the institution.

